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INTRODUCTION
One of the often overlooked, yet perhaps more potent of weapons in the U.S. military arsenal is the military advisor. Their role is complex and conducted in a dynamic climate with impacts spanning tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. They are critical enablers for geographic commanders to successfully conduct their missions in accordance with national policy. As such, it is imperative that those individuals selected for advisor duty are properly trained. T.E. Lawrence, in his "Twenty-Seven Articles", emphasized "success (of the advisor) will be proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it." 1 While each of the Services currently operate separate pre-deployment advisor training programs, most efforts focus on the necessary physical aspects like combat employment and force protection measures, at the expense of developing critical "mental" skills. Specifically, current training methods lack a systematic way of providing new advisors with key abilities to compel their counterpart to action. This requires language immersion, cultural awareness, and an understanding of the art of influence in human interactions. Despite each Service's effort, a notable training shortfall still exists that can best be solved via a combined approach.
The thesis of this paper is that the creation of a joint military advisor training course is essential in order to arm future advisors with critical tools necessary to positively influence their environments, and to improve the combatant commander's ability to shape their geographic areas. While this is clearly relevant and important to all geographic combatant commands, this paper will mainly focus on CENTCOM and the ongoing Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) advising efforts. To further narrow the paper's scope, much of the discussion will center on how the Air Force has attacked this issue. However, Marine Corps and Army advisor training efforts will also be addressed to identify any solutions that can apply to a joint training venture. Since the Navy utilizes advisors on a smaller scale, they will not be discussed in the context of this paper.
DISCUSSION
The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) clearly outlines the importance for combatant commanders to focus on security assistance (SA) programs. The QDR states that shifting our military effort to enable foreign partners via expanding their capacities, building key relationships, and establishing trust will prove especially valuable in the fight against terrorism. 2 The 2006 National Security Strategy identifies these SA programs as an effective means of preventing problems from escalating into full blown crises. 3 This has particular relevance to the efforts to fight insurgency worldwide. In a report by the RAND Corporation, the United States currently has SA relationships with nearly 80% of nations known to contain some level of insurgent activities. 4 The burden of these programs falls directly on the combatant commands' shoulders, as specified in unclassified portions of the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). This document charges combatant commanders with developing security cooperation activities and supporting plans which address advising nations to build capabilities. 5 Commanders rely on advisors to achieve successful results.
Thus, the role of the advisor holds significant importance to combatant commands like CENTCOM, and is also held as such by the Services. War College professor, defines factor "space" as involving both physical space and "humanspace", including religious, cultural, and social influences. 9 OIF advisors must contend with a complex "space" in conducting their duties. It often includes a dangerous combat working environment, a vastly different culture, language barriers, unfamiliar physical territory and unknown human relationships. Every aspect of "space" largely impacts an advisor's job.
Additionally, Vego states that the factor of "time" is valuable, as it is the only factor you cannot get back. More importantly, the lack of it can force the operational commander to act in haste. 10 For the OIF advisor, this is often a critical predicament. On the one hand, they are loyal to their chain of command (and eventually up to the CENTCOM Commander)
which specifies timelines and milestones to achieve in accordance with the overall campaign plan. At the same time, they must contend with the priorities and pace of effort of the Iraqi counterparts that they advise. Often these two timelines are not in synch, complicating the advisor's job and making the relationship with their counterpart at times precarious.
As for the factor of "force", Vego explains that the "available combat potential" of the military force to accomplish the mission includes elements such as leadership, manning, morale, equipment, tactics, doctrine, and training. 11 With any advisory situation, the skills, experience, personality, qualifications, and training-especially pre-deployment trainingconstitutes the force that the OIF advisor brings to the "fight." Finally, Vego emphasizes the need to properly evaluate space-time-force factors and to balance them in order to accomplish a specific military, theater-strategic, or intermediate operational objective.
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This requirement to balance space-time-force factors identifies the critical need for the OIF advisor. The best means of overcoming factors "space" and "time" is to counter with a sufficient factor "force." More specifically, the quality of pre-deployment training an advisor receives is absolutely essential to overcome these limitations, and can make or break their ability to succeed in their duties. Pre-deployment training becomes arguably the most important of the force aspects to consider due to the time-critical nature of the training; in other words, it is the one variable that can be used to enhance the new advisor's abilities as they are preparing to deploy. So, who is responsible to prepare military advisors for the specific environment they will face and tasks that will be required of them? Joint Publication 3-07.1 states combatant commanders are charged with the direction of all joint training of assigned forces, and for coordinating with the services regarding specific training requirements. The services, in turn, are responsible for providing trained forces to the combatant commands. 13 In the case of advisors, the traditional home for training rests within each Service's special operations communities. The Army, for its part, has expanded their pre-deployment advisor training by tasking the First Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas to conduct this training. A review of their notional training calendar and lesson descriptions shows that in addition to reinforcing vital combat skills required for the deployment, the training focuses on language, culture, advisor duties, and role-playing scenarios. 22 The Marines have also significantly modified their previous training plan to train advisors. Andrew Milburn and Mark Lombard, Marine officers with Iraqi Army advisory experience, explain that this training evolved from three days of briefing-centric training to a 21-day course that included language and cultural skills along with critical combat training. 23 Per the base's website, this task was recently turned over to the Advisor Training Group at Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Base, California. 24 So, at face value, it appears each of the Services is providing their advisors with a training focus sufficient to bolster their individual factor "force." Thus, they should be able to adequately deal with operational factors of space and time to accomplish their deployed missions to OIF and OEF. Unfortunately, a closer look illustrates that, despite strong efforts from each Service, there are still significant shortcomings in pre-deployment advisor training that warrant combatant commander attention. A joint advisor training effort is the solution.
ANALYSIS
Retired Air Force Major General Edward Lansdale said of his experiences advising in both the Philippines and Vietnam that in order to succeed in the role, advisors "should spend every moment possible in gaining understanding of its people and then act within earned friendship." 25 In essence, he marked the value of study for building trust, a critical enabler for an advisor's success. Norman Brozenick, a former 6 SOS Commander, adds that forging trust to advise forces is nearly impossible without a respect for foreign culture and politics, and solid communication skills. 26 Merged with what the Air Force's FID doctrine calls the advisor's "tradecraft"-abilities gained through experience, self-study, and training-these are the qualifications, skills, and personality relating to the operational factor "force" that fills the advisor's toolkit. 27 Pre-deployment training can clearly deliver an immediate impact.
Unfortunately, the analysis to follow shows there are serious disconnects in the Services' separate efforts that can likely be solved via a joint approach to advisor training.
Certainly for most personnel performing advisory duty in the OIF or OEF combat zones, a focus on necessary "physical" skills such as combat lifesaving, weapons proficiency, and force protection is essential. But what appears to be consistently lacking centers on some of the key "mental" tools that enable advisors to overcome space and time considerations.
Simply put, there is not enough emphasis on a comprehensive understanding of language and culture, as well as on the critical importance of the ability to influence in the success of advisory duty.
A closer look at the Army's advisor training schedule at Fort Riley gives an example.
During the entire 60-day pre-deployment training, 42 hours are dedicated to either Arabic (for OIF) or Dari (for OEF) language training. 24 hours are spent in culture immersion lessons, intended to establish a "baseline understanding" through historical, cultural, and religious briefs. 28 This averages out to only one hour a day for critical language training and cultural issues. The course also includes a few lessons on the role of the advisor, gaining influence, counterinsurgency, and "leader meets" where advisor students attend, but not necessarily participate in, role-playing sessions. The rest focuses on required combat skills.
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The same can be said of the Marines' advisor training course schedule. Of the 19 training days available, one day is identified as dedicated to language and culture training, Also, only 30-45 minutes daily was allocated to language study, consisting of review of basic Arabic phrases. 33 The feedback from those who attended these courses and deployed for OIF air advisor duty was consistent. While acknowledging the value of combat lessons, the vast majority advocated reducing the time spent on these lessons and increasing the emphasis on language, culture, history, politics, and advisor tactics, techniques and procedures. Understanding the cultural environment-the second of the critical mental skills-is closely related to language capabilities. Then-Lieutenant General David Petraeus stated "cultural awareness is a force multiplier … and that people are, in many respects, the decisive terrain … we must study that terrain in the same way that we have always studied the geographic terrain." 41 This should be a call to action for combatant commanders as they are charged with directing advisor training. Simply put, a basic indoctrination in culture is not enough. Edward Stewart, a PhD who studied Vietnam advisor issues, said many advisor problems stemmed from a lack of familiarity with cultural patterns, leading to friction. 42 In her Naval Postgraduate School thesis on culture's importance as it pertains to predeployment training, Jennifer Chandler suggests that current training fails to attain the proper higher levels of learning. Rather, this familiarization lacks the cross-cultural communication piece, which she defines as providing awareness of our own biases while understanding both similarities and differences between given cultures. 43 Perhaps this might be changing across the Services, however. For example, Dan Henk, Deputy Director of the Air University Culture and Language Center at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, describes one dimension of crosscultural competence as "deep cultural expertise." Careful study of ideas like subordinateleader relationships, he asserts, can help the military member-in this case, advisor-build relationships and the ability to influence the counterpart. 44 Perhaps now-Major General
Allardice summed it up best saying differences in cultures must be accounted for by advisors when trying to influence, for not doing so will result in frustration and a waste of resources. 45 This drives the discussion to the third, and often least considered yet important mental tool for the advisor, the ability to influence to effect results. On the one hand, this ability constitutes a valuable mix of the individual's personality and experience. According to a study of military advisors in Korea led by the Human Resources Research Organization, the ability of an advisor to influence a counterpart depended largely on the perceptions of how sincere, competent, and trustworthy the advisor was. 46 In most cultures like in OIF and OEF, the issue of trust can be either the primary key to success or, if lacking, the doorway to doom.
Advisors must build trust by demonstrating to their advisees they have the experience to be relevant. As important, advisors must draw on personality traits to, as Milburn and Lombard describe, display a good mix of persistence, forcefulness, and patience to maintain trust. 47 The ability to influence also boils down to the advisor's ability to negotiate, or "sell" ideas in a convincing manner to elicit a positive response. Kent Strader, an Army officer with Saudi National Guard advising experience, argues the ability to negotiate, especially in the Arab culture, is inseparable from advising. 48 For the most part, this skill is relatively foreign to most military members and thus must be developed. Highlighting the value of one approach in building interacting skills in advisors, a study was undertaken in 1966 by the Air Force's Aerospace Medical Research Labs. Subjects were divided in two groups; one group learned skills via reading training manuals with a few role-playing sessions, while the other included a study of their videotaped sessions. Students who were hands-on via this selfconfrontation process learned faster and were found superior in retaining the critical skills. 49 This interacting learning method is effectively applied to "sales" training today by the Air Force Recruiting Service in their recruiter course. Students are given seven separate "lab" events where they are put into a specialized recruiting "office" with prospective "recruits."
Not only are they critiqued by the role-playing instructors, but they are also able to self-study their sales improvement as the course progresses. 50 This example of experience-based training, if expanded, could build the advisor's influence ability with lasting mission impact.
In summary, three key tools-language familiarity, an understanding of culture, and the ability to influence-are vital to be an effective advisor. Yet, each Service's training is sub-optimal with regard to all three. While a joint approach seems sensible, there are counter-arguments to this idea. John Nagl, advocate of a permanent Army advisor corps, believes advisor training can effectively be embedded within the corps. 51 A RAND study suggested the Air Force expand the 6 SOS into a wing that would handle all air advisor training needs. 52 Others like Bauer claim pre-deployment language training is too late to carry any meaningful impact. 53 He also implies an emphasis on more training would extend the advisor training pipeline and subsequently lengthen an already-long deployment. 54 Cost would certainly be another sticking point in any joint training effort; for example, Bauer cites a previous idea for revising Air Force pre-deployment advisor training carried with it a twoyear, 15 million dollar price tag. 55 Finally, the argument could also be made that rather than creating a new course, each Service should expand their programs as needed to provide better training in key areas. While each of these potential points of contention or alternate ideas have merit, they don't necessarily override the benefits to be gained from the pursuit of a joint alternative.
CONCLUSIONS
Each Service's current advisor pre-deployment training is improving, but possesses a heavy emphasis on physical combat skills at the expense of the mental skills the advisor role depends upon. This leaves a capability shortfall inherent in most advisors as they perform their duties. The solution to filling this gap lies in developing a joint military advisor training course that offers a comprehensive focus on the fundamentals-language, cultural, and influence skills-required of the advisor. It would serve as the basic, in-depth training for all advisors-to-be. Upon completing this course, they would then attend service-specific training focusing on combat skills and mission tasks tailored to the deployed environment.
Despite concerns over this idea, there are clear reasons why a joint advisor training course would be an essential benefit for advisors and, as a result, for their geographic commanders.
First and foremost, there is no denying the impact the advisor can have across all three levels of warfare. Even a tactical or operational level advisor, as FM 3-24 declares, can have long-term strategic implications. 56 The GEF charges combatant commanders with developing plans that provide for advising partner nations, yet the predominant focus of the overall current advisor training effort, with few exceptions, focuses on CENTCOM. This begs the question, what are we doing to build a permanent training capacity that is able to meet the needs of all geographic commands? A steady-state joint advisor course which focuses on world-wide projected requirements can ensure fully trained and capable advisors are ready to make positive impacts for each combatant command at all levels of war.
In this day and age, it is clear the U.S. military will continue to gravitate more and more towards joint endeavors across the entire spectrum of operations. From permanent basing to support agencies to task forces, the joint approach is the way our military operates, now and in the future. The QDR shows that "jointness" applies to training, by specifying advances in joint training are "urgently needed" to prepare for future operations. 57 There are also doctrinal roots; for example, the Air Force's FID doctrine states advisory efforts should be integrated at joint levels. 58 Thus, higher level guidance supports a joint training solution.
This concept is not only important to senior leaders, but it also holds value to advisors poised to take on this difficult mission. It is imperative that advisors understand roles and missions of sister Services to be effective and knowledgeable with a foreign armed force. Developing influencing ability should rely heavily on study of interpersonal skills and how they apply between differing cultures to build confidence in negotiation tactics. This training ties into culture immersion lessons, but should also include study of the military dynamics in the deployed region. The student should be familiarized with the structure and capabilities of the host nation's armed forces to be aware of the future counterpart's working environment. In particular, this training should include a number of role-playing scenarios.
Some can be informal instructor-led exercises, but most need to allow direct student involvement. These scenarios would emphasize individual or very small group dynamics, with realistic settings and use of multimedia equipment. This would enable students to join faculty in directly reviewing and critiquing their performance to expedite their learning curve. Finally, lessons learned from previous advisory experience, both in general and tailored to the region to be deployed, should be incorporated to the maximum extent possible.
In summary, the advisor training challenge is not easy. Major General Allardice forewarns that new advisors need to be "ready to sprint a marathon". 60 To effectively and properly fill our military advisors' toolkits with skills necessary to succeed in a complex operational space-time-force environment, it will take a paradigm shift in the way each Service currently does its training. It will incur some financial cost in tough economic times for our military, and will require valued additional time away from home station for those selected for this duty. Despite the difficulty, it is time to revise our training approach.
The role of an advisor is a difficult yet important one. David Kilcullen, a leading counterinsurgency (COIN) expert, says to win the COIN fight the host nation people "must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises." 61 The exact same can be said of the advisor's challenge as well. To succeed in this task is a daunting one, considering complex factor "space" considerations of unfamiliar cultures and often dangerous working conditions. Combine this with difficult time factors and it is clearly imperative that we arm these human "weapon systems" with the best training available. When this training is combined with each individual's experience, personality, and abilities, the combatant commanders can rest assured that their advisors will have the "force" needed to provide the maximum positive influence at all levels of warfare.
